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I
INTRODUCTION
The western liberal states have practical and humanitarian interests in
preventing other states from being taken over by dictators and in encouraging
democratic reform in existing dictatorships. Dictatorships often mistreat and
impoverish their own citizens and commit atrocities. Dictatorships also produce
refugee crises, fight with their neighbors, and provide havens for terrorists.
Because dictatorships rarely enjoy the broad support of their own citizens, they
are vulnerable to insurgencies and civil war.
Yet liberal states have taken an ambivalent attitude toward dictatorships.
On the one hand, governments of liberal states make clear that they disapprove
of dictatorships and usually subject them to diplomatic pressure. Particularly
bad dictatorships may be subject to sanctions of various sorts, including
economic sanctions; and some are subverted or attacked. Recent examples
include the invasion of Iraq, the intervention in Kosovo, the sanctions imposed
on Sudan, and the long-running sanctions on Cuba. Only in rare instances are
dictators prosecuted for their crimes.
On the other hand, western governments also frequently cooperate with
dictatorships. They authorize trade, including the sale of weapons; they
authorize private investment; they even give foreign aid to the dictatorships.
Indeed, cooperation is the more common practice. China, Russia, Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, and many other authoritarian states that routinely abuse their citizens
are permitted to join international organizations, enjoy liberal trading
relationships with the western powers, and in some cases receive foreign aid.
During the Cold War, the United States and its allies supported dictatorships
that took a hard line against the Soviet Union.
This ambivalence reflects the conflicting interests of western states. They
have humanitarian and strategic interests in encouraging democracy and respect
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for human rights; but they also have strong strategic interests in trading,
entering military alliances, and in other ways cooperating with dictatorships,
especially powerful dictatorships. Indeed, even humanitarian reasons can be
given for such cooperation; it is often argued that engagement is more likely to
lead to reform than isolation, and in any event it is often the case that western
powers need the assistance of dictatorships in order to perform humanitarian
missions. For example, China and Russia wield vetoes on the United Nations
Security Council, so any lawful humanitarian military intervention needs their
permission, which they are likely to withhold if they believe that western states
seek to isolate them.
These complexities suggest that liberal states will usually have to take a
flexible approach to dictatorships—constantly adjusting the degree of
cooperation or isolation in response to events. States need to take account not
only of liberalizing tendencies, which they will want to reward; they also have to
keep in mind the extent to which a dictatorship may become more or less
important for its strategic interests. A government that tries to isolate Syria
because of its terrorist ties might end up needing to cooperate with it in order to
resolve the conflict in Iraq.1 States also worry that the sanctions they impose
might fail to dislodge the dictator while imposing hardship on the public—the
opposite of their purpose. The sanctions on Iraq from 1993 to 2003 had just this
effect.2 It is thus not surprising that empirical studies of sanction regimes suggest
that they usually fail to accomplish the ends of the states that imposed the
sanctions.3
Frustrated with the limited success of sanction regimes, some scholars and
advocates argue that sanctions should be legalized—that is, sanctions should be
required by international law when certain conditions are satisfied, rather than
imposed episodically on the basis of political considerations. Current interest
focuses on the odious debt doctrine, which provides that a successor regime is
not responsible for paying the debts of a prior regime if those debts were
incurred by an authoritarian government and used to enrich it officials rather
than to benefit the public.4 The legal status of the doctrine is controversial, but
it has many advocates.5
1. See CONGRESSIONALLY APPOINTED PANEL, THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT: THE WAY
FORWARD – A NEW APPROACH 37 (2006) (JAMES A. BAKER, III & LEE H. HAMILTON, CO-CHAIRS)
(recommending that the United States “engage directly with Iran and Syria in order to try to gain their
commitment to constructive policies toward Iraq and other regional issues”).
2. See David Cortright & George A. Lopez, Are Sanctions Just? The Problematic Case of Iraq, 52
J. INT’L AFFAIRS 33 (1999).
3. See GARY C. HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: HISTORY AND
CURRENT POLICY 92–93 (2d ed. 1990) (finding that, based on their criteria, sanctions were successful in
about thirty-four percent of 116 postwar cases).
4. For recent discussions of the doctrine and its history, see, for example, Lee. C. Buchheit, G.
Mitu Gulati & Robert B. Thompson, The Dilemma of Odious Debts, 56 DUKE L.J. 1201 (2007); Adam
Feibelman, Equitable Subordination, Fraudulent Transfer, and Sovereign Debt, 70 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. (forthcoming Autumn 2007).
5. See, e.g., PATRICIA ADAMS, ODIOUS DEBTS: LOOSE LENDING, CORRUPTION, AND THE
THIRD WORLD’S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY (1991); Seema Jayachandran & Michael Kremer, Odious
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It should be clear that the odious debt doctrine is not meant as an overall
solution to the problem of how to treat dictators. It does not interfere with
trade or travel or other things that dictators might care about; it interferes only
with lending. Thus, one puzzle raised by the doctrine is why lending, rather than
trade, should be subject to legal regulation and whether there is any point in
restricting cooperation along one dimension while maintaining it along others.
The odious debt doctrine also does not address the benefits of cooperating with
dictators; it does not excuse a dictator who arrests terrorists at the request of
western governments, who takes in refugees from a conflict in a bordering
country, or who provides assistance in a humanitarian intervention.
For these and related reasons, support for the odious debt doctrine at this
point is premature and unwise. As this article shows, it is unclear whether the
doctrine will improve the welfare of the population that might be subject to a
dictatorship. Although a selective application of the doctrine can improve
welfare in principle, it is unlikely such selective application would be
practicable. If incorporated into international law, there is a danger that the
odious debt doctrine would do more harm than good.
II
THE NORMATIVE CASE FOR THE ODIOUS DEBT DOCTRINE
Defenders of the odious debt doctrine often rest their case on the simple
and apparently morally compelling claim that an impoverished population that
has recently overthrown a dictator should not have to pay sovereign debt
incurred by the dictator to pay for personal gain. But the well-being of the postdictatorship population cannot be taken in isolation; one needs to consider the
likely impact of the doctrine on the well-being of the population before the
dictator is overthrown and on the well-being of populations who are never able
to escape a dictatorship. To do this, one needs to take an ex ante perspective,
comparing the well-being of affected populations in a world in which the
doctrine exists and a world in which it does not.
The conventional ex ante defense of the rule does just this. Suppose
creditors know they cannot collect if the money lent to a dictator is used to
finance his private consumption. Creditors will respond to the rule by declining
to make such loans or by charging a higher interest rate. As a result, dictators
will not be able to borrow for private consumption, and more money will be left
for future generations of the population. As the dictator is just a single person
with a lot of money already, who therefore obtains a small marginal gain from

Debt, 96 AMER. ECON. REV. 82 (2006) (arguing that loan sanctions would be more effective than trade
sanctions); ASHFAQ KHALFAN, JEFF KING & BRIAN THOMAS, CTR. FOR INT’L SUSTAINABLE DEV.
LAW, ADVANCING THE ODIOUS DEBT DOCTRINE (Mar. 2003), http://www.odiousdebts.org/
odiousdebts/publications/Advancing_the_Odious_Debt_Doctrine.pdf. Some authors reject the doctrine
but support its premises and seek other legal means for operationalizing them. See, e.g., Buchheit et al.,
supra note 4 (describing domestic legal analogies); Feibelman, supra note 4 (advocating a contractual
mechanism).
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an additional dollar, and as the future public is poor and thus will value an
additional dollar a lot, the restriction on lending should, by transferring wealth
from the dictator to the future public, produce a welfare gain. Of course, not all
dictators start off as wealthy people, and some dictators are just figureheads of
groups, but the same point holds: the power-holders are, in general, much
wealthier than the public.
Potentially of even greater importance, would-be dictators may be deterred
from taking power if they anticipate that they will not be able to borrow for
personal gain even though they control the government. If so, the odious debt
doctrine will, in the long run, reduce the number of dictatorships and in this way
improve the well-being of populations that would be subject to dictatorships but
for the deterrent effect of the doctrine. Meanwhile, the loss of the lending
opportunity to creditors, most of which are firms with relatively wealthy
shareholders, is likely to have a small impact on utility. In the short run, profits
might be somewhat smaller, but the international lending market is highly
liquid, and investors should be able to find nearly as good opportunities. In the
long run, lending opportunities will not be reduced because creditors can lend
to the additional states that do not have dictatorships as a result of the odious
debt doctrine. This argument in favor of restrictions on lending is no different
from an argument in favor of any other kind of sanction, from economic to
military, and thus whether it is true or not depends on the basic considerations
for and against sanctioning.6
III
A MODEL OF THE ODIOUS DEBT DOCTRINE
The argument described above is excessively optimistic; it overlooks
significant practical difficulties. The following model of odious debt financing
addresses some of these difficulties. Of particular interest here is whether a
dictator, who attempts to stay in power for a long period and to maximize his
personal gain, will borrow from abroad for immediate consumption or for
deferred consumption through longer-term investments. This model also
analyzes how the odious debt doctrine will affect the dictator’s choice regarding
short- or long-term loans and how that, in turn, will affect the public. The model
will demonstrate that while the dictator will prefer the lending regime without
the doctrine, whether the public will benefit from the doctrine is unclear and
depends on complex factors.

6. This point is obvious but is mentioned because some commentators might be read to say
otherwise. See, e.g., Jayachandran & Kremer, supra note 5, at 88 (“[L]oan sanctions make the
population better off in future periods [than trade sanctions do] since it has no debt repayment to
make.”). However, Jayachandran and Kremer acknowledge in a footnote that this is false if the dictator
can trade nonrenewable resources, id. at 88 n.7, which in our view is fatal to their claim. See discussion
infra Part III.C.
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A. The Model
There are four periods in the model. At t=1, a potential dictator decides
whether to stage a coup. Although the cost of staging a coup is not explicitly
modeled here, it is assumed that it is costly and the dictator’s decision depends
on his expected utility from success. If he comes into power at t=2, he borrows
money from abroad and spends either on private consumption or on a quasipublic investment. He can also decide not to borrow at all, in which case he will
rely only on the resources provided by the country. Borrowing from abroad is
accompanied by a promise to pay back at t=4. At t=3, the dictator is overthrown
with some positive probability. It is assumed that it is costly for the public to
overthrow the dictator and the public’s decision depends, in part, on its
expected gain from overthrowing him. At t=4, if the dictator was overthrown at
t=3, then a representative government either repudiates the debt that was
borrowed by the dictator in t=2 or pays it back, depending on whether the
odious debt doctrine is in place or not. If the dictator is not overthrown at t=3,
the dictator must pay back the loan he borrowed at t=2. It is also assumed that
if the odious debt doctrine is not in place, both the representative government
and the dictator will pay back the money at t=4 because they are concerned
about their future borrowing capacity.7
If the dictator does not come to power at t=1, a representative government
will not borrow at t=2 and instead will consume all domestically available
resources. The country will behave in the same fashion at t=3 with or without a
dictator. At t=4, there will be no debt to pay in the absence of a coup at t=1.
Suppose at t=2 and t=4, the country generates a cash flow of r>0 per period
that the dictator can extract for his own benefit at t=2 or use to repay the debt
at t=4. At t=2, assume the dictator can borrow amount d from abroad. For the
sake of simplicity, there is no time discount, and the interest rate that is charged
by the competitive international banking industry is zero. Also assume the
probability (p) of overthrowing the dictator at t=3 is p1 if the odious debt
doctrine is in place, and p2 if the doctrine is not in place, where the probabilities
are strictly between zero and one. Finally, the country generates enough cash
flow to satisfy the debt at t=4: r>d.
After the dictator comes into power at t=1, he cares about his expected
utility, given by c2+(1-p)•c4 , where c2 and c4 are the amounts of resources the
dictator consumes in periods two and four. The level of consumption will
depend on the amount of resources he extracts from the public, money
borrowed from abroad, and the cash flow generated by a quasi-public
investment. The public’s utility is given by u(b2)+p•u(b4)+(1-p)•u(b'4), where b2,

7. This model ends at t=4, but we can imagine that this is just one stage in a repeated game
framework. For instance, if the dictator is not overthrown at t=3, we can think of the fourth period as
being equivalent to the second, whereas if the dictator is overthrown at t=3, we can assume that the
game starts again from t=1. While a repeated game can support many different types of equilibrium,
one possibility is for the government to pay back at t=4 and the lending institutions to lend again in the
future.
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b4, and b'4 are the levels of consumption the public enjoy in period two, four
with overthrow, and four without overthrow, respectively. It is assumed that if
the dictator takes away $1 from the public, the loss of utility to the public is
larger than the utility the dictator gains; that is, u'>1. Also, assume that u' is
constant and u(0)=0. If the (potential) dictator does not come into power at t=1,
it is assumed that his utility is zero, and the public consumes the cash flow r in
each period: its utility is u(r)+u(r).
1. The Case of No Borrowing
Suppose the dictator does not borrow. Conditional on being in power, the
dictator will take away the entire cash flow r in t=2 and again in t=4 for his
private consumption. The public will have something for its own consumption
only when the dictator is out of power in t=4 so the public, by overthrowing the
dictator at t=3, expects to gain u(r). Overthrowing the dictator is costly and an
attempt to overthrow may not always be successful, and this will lead to some
probability p that determines whether the dictator will be in power. The
dictator’s utility, therefore, is r+(1-p)•r, and the public’s utility is p•u(r). At t=1,
a potential dictator will compare the expected benefit r+(1-p)•r with the cost of
staging a coup, and this will determine the probability of the dictator coming
into power: q.
2. Borrowing for Pure Consumption
Suppose the dictator is in power and borrows d at t=2 for personal
consumption. Consumption does not generate any future cash flow. How much
the international banking community will charge for this loan will depend on
the existence of the odious debt doctrine. If the subsequent government at t=4
can (and will) repudiate the debt under the odious debt doctrine, and since the
banks can recover their lending only under the dictatorial regime, they will
demand, as repayment at t=4, d/(1-p1). If the subsequent government must pay
back the loan, they will demand d.
Without the odious debt doctrine, the dictator will borrow d at t=2, consume
r+d at t=2, and repay d at t=4 if he is in power. At period four, he will again
extract everything for his personal consumption. His utility, therefore, is
(r+d)+(1-p2)(r-d), which is equal to r+(1-p2)•r+p2•d. The public receives no
money at t=2 but is saddled with the obligation of repayment after the dictator
has been overthrown. The public’s utility is p2•u(r-d). If the doctrine is in place,
the banks can recover from the dictator only if the dictator is not overthrown at
t=3. The dictator’s utility is (r+d)+(1-p1)(r-d/(1-p1)), which is equal to r+(1-p1)•r.
The public enjoys p1•u(r). Not surprisingly, the public enjoys a higher utility
level with the odious debt doctrine, and the dictator enjoys higher utility
without the doctrine.
When the odious debt doctrine is not in place, the dictator’s borrowing from
abroad for personal consumption imposes a negative externality onto the future
government, because the future government must bear the burden of
repayment. The difference in the two cases is the amount of this externality:
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approximately p2•u(d). What the odious debt doctrine does, then, is to make the
dictator internalize this negative externality by paying back more in case he
stays in power. In some cases, the size of the repayment demand will be large
enough, that is, d/(1-p1)>r, to prevent the dictator from borrowing for personal
consumption altogether.
Now, it is easy to understand what the potential problem of the odious debt
doctrine is. Because the doctrine causes the dictator to internalize only the
negative externality (by having to pay back more in case he stays in power), any
project that has some positive externality for the public will become less
attractive for the dictator. The banking community does not care about the
amount of positive externality that a project (at t=2) can impose onto the
public. It cares only about repayment. This can be illustrated with the following
example.
3. Borrowing for a Quasi-Public Investment
Suppose the dictator can borrow d at t=2 to implement a project. The
project generates a cash flow of x and also a public benefit of u(y) in t=4. It will
be assumed that the dictator can take the entire x away but not u(y). Think of x
as the additional cash flow and u(y) as some intangible consumption benefit
that accrues to the public. For the project to be worthwhile for the dictator,
assume that x>d. On the other hand, u(y) can be greater than or equal to zero.
As an example, the project might be building infrastructure (like drilling an oil
well, digging a mine, building a road, constructing a power station) that
generates cash flow that the dictator can grab but also generates some benefit
for the public. This model allows for the possibility that the investment only
generates cash flow that the dictator can grab: u(y)=0. Meanwhile, this model
assumes that the initial revenue r will be consumed by the dictator.8
Without the odious debt doctrine, the banks will demand d for repayment at
t=4. Conditional on implementing the project, the dictator will enjoy the utility
of r+(1-p2)•(r+x-d). At t=2, the dictator will extract the entire r for personal
consumption and borrow d to implement the project. At t=4, once the project
generates the cash flow of x, the dictator takes all of it while paying back the d
that was borrowed. The public will enjoy the utility of u(y)+p2•u(r+x-d). At t=2,
the public gets no money. But the project provides the public the utility of u(y)
as well as the added benefit of u(x-d) in case the dictator is overthrown.
With the odious debt doctrine, assume that the international community
cannot tell whether the dictator has spent the borrowed money on a quasipublic project or on purely personal consumption. After all, the proponent may
argue that since the dictator’s motive for borrowing is for investment that

8. Although the dictator can use the existing resources (r) to finance the project, borrowing from
abroad will be more beneficial for him since it leaves more for his consumption. Borrowing becomes
even more attractive if the repayment obligation is partly borne by the future government.
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generates more wealth for his own pocket in the future—especially when
u(y)=0—the doctrine should still apply to this type of spending.9 Now, for
borrowing d at t=2, the bank demands d/(1-p1) at t=4, assuming the dictator has
not been thrown out. The dictator will enjoy the utility of r+(1-p1)(r+x-d/(1-p1)).
The public will enjoy the utility of u(y)+p1•u(r+x). The difference from the
previous example is that, whereas the dictator gets to enjoy the cash flow
benefit of the project only with probability (1-p1), he has to bear the entire
borrowing cost. The project generates a positive externality for the public.
4. Choice Among Investment, Consumption, and No Borrowing
The choice the dictator faces at t=2 is to borrow and invest in the project, to
borrow for purely personal consumption, or not to borrow at all. When the
odious debt doctrine is in place, by not borrowing or borrowing for personal
consumption, the dictator realizes the expected utility of r+(1-p1)•r, and the
public receives an expected utility of p1•u(r). If he were to borrow to invest in
the project, he gets an expected utility of r+(1-p1)(r+x-d/(1-p1)), while the public
receives an expected utility of u(y)+p1•u(x+r). Hence, when the dictator is
deciding whether to invest or to consume what he borrows, he will borrow to
invest only when x-d/(1-p1)>0 or (1-p1)x>d.

No borrowing10
Personal
consumption
Quasi-public project

With the odious debt doctrine
Dictator’s utility
Public’s utility
r+(1-p1)•r
p•u(r)
r+(1-p1)•r

p1•u(r)

R+(1-p1)(r+x-d/(1-p1)

u(y)+p1•u(x+r)

Without the odious debt doctrine, between investing in the project and not
borrowing at all, the dictator will invest. By investing, he realizes the utility of
r+(1-p2)(r+x-d), while the public enjoys u(y)+p2•u(r+x-d). If he were to borrow
for personal consumption, on the other hand, he gets r+(1-p2)•r+p2•d and the
public receives p2•u(r-d). Between borrowing to invest and borrowing to
consume, if (1-p2)(x-d)>p2•d, he will invest, but if (1-p2)(x-d)<p2•d, he will borrow
for personal consumption. The comparison is between the magnitude of the
negative externality he can impose on the public for consumption borrowing
versus the amount of benefit he receives from investing in the project.

9. This is the view of many supporters of the doctrine. See sources cited infra note 15.
10. We can make the probability of overthrowing the dictator independent of the odious debt
regime when the dictator does not borrow, but this will not change the substantive results of the paper.
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No borrowing

Without the odious debt doctrine
Dictator’s utility
Public’s utility
r+(1-p2)•r
p2•u(r)

Personal consumption

r+(1-p2)•r+p2•d

p2•u(r-d)

Quasi-public project

r+(1-p2)(r+x-d)

u(y)+p2•u(r+x-d)
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What is interesting about this comparison is that if the doctrine does not
affect the probability of overthrowing the dictator—that is, if p1=p2=p—the
decision of the dictator as to whether to borrow to invest or borrow to consume
does not depend on the regime. Whether or not the doctrine is in place, the
dictator will borrow to invest rather than to consume if and only if (1-p)x>d.
Although surprising at first, the logic is intuitive. Consider first the case with the
doctrine. Compared to the case in which the dictator borrows for personal
consumption, borrowing for investment provides an additional benefit of (1-p)•x
to the dictator while imposing the (debt) cost of d. He bears the full cost of the
debt because the banking community increases the repayment amount, from d
to d/(1-p), to eliminate the risk of no repayment if the dictator is overthrown.
When the doctrine is not in place, by borrowing for personal consumption,
the dictator is able to impose a negative externality onto the public if he is
overthrown. The benefit to the dictator is p•d. If he borrows for investment,
therefore, he must bear not only the cost of repayment, (1-p)•d, but also this
forgone opportunity. So the full cost of borrowing for investment is d. On the
benefit side, he enjoys the additional cash flow of x only when he is not
overthrown. The dictator will therefore invest with the borrowed money if and
only if (1-p)•x is larger than d, which is the same as in the case with the doctrine.
What will be different between the two cases, however, is the probability of
being overthrown at t=3 and the probability of a dictator coming into power at
t=1. With the doctrine, because the public has more to gain from overthrowing
the dictator, it is more likely to overthrow than not. Conditional on p, the
public’s utility is strictly higher with the odious debt doctrine than without.
Hence, it can be assumed that p2<p1 in equilibrium, so that d/(1-p2)<d/(1-p1).
Because the dictator now faces a different probability of being able to stay in
power, his decision about whether to borrow to invest or to consume will also
be different. Consider three possible cases.11

11. It is also possible that, within each regime, the dictator’s choice between investment and
personal consumption will affect the probability of overthrowing. For instance, with the doctrine, when
the dictator borrows for personal consumption, the public, by overthrowing, gets the additional utility
of u(r). If the dictator invests, however, the public receives the additional utility of u(x+r). Hence,
investing can actually provide more incentive to the public to overthrow the dictatorial regime.
However, our analysis on how the probabilities are different across the two regimes will not be
affected.
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Case 1. If x<d/(1-p2)<d/(1-p1), under both regimes, the dictator just borrows
from abroad for his personal consumption. The dictator prefers the regime with
no odious debt doctrine, r+(1-p2)•r+p•d>r+(1-p1)•r, since, without the doctrine,
not only can he impose a negative externality onto the successor government,
but he is also more likely to stay in power at t=4 because the public has a lower
incentive to overthrow his government. The public realizes p1•u(r) with the
odious debt doctrine and p2•u(r-d) without it. The public strictly prefers the
imposition of the odious debt doctrine for the same reasons: it does not want to
bear the negative externality imposed by the dictator, and it is more likely to set
up a representative government at t=4. Stepping back further, given that the
dictator earns a higher utility under the regime without the odious debt
doctrine, the dictator is more likely to attempt a coup at t=1 when the odious
debt doctrine is not in place.
Case 2. If d/(1-p2)<d/(1-p1)<x, the dictator makes the quasi-public
investment under both regimes. The dictator realizes a higher expected utility
under the regime without the odious debt doctrine: r+(1-p2)(r+x-d)>r+(1p1)(r+x-d/(1-p1)). This is because (1) the dictator does not need to bear the full
cost of debt and (2) he is more likely to stay in power without the odious debt
doctrine. As for the public, since p1>p2 and x+r>x+r-d, it again strictly prefers
the regime with the odious debt doctrine. It receives the positive externality
from the dictator’s investment without having to bear the debt cost and is more
likely to overthrow the dictator at t=3. Since the dictator realizes a higher
expected utility without the odious debt doctrine, the probability of coup at t=1
will be higher without the doctrine.
Case 3. When d/(1-p2)<x<d/(1-p1), the dictator implements the quasi-public
project when there is no odious debt doctrine but borrows for personal
consumption when the doctrine is in place. The dictator expects utility of r+(1p2)(r+x-d) without the doctrine and r+(1-p1)r with it. Since p1>p2 and x-d>0, the
dictator prefers the scenario with no odious debt doctrine: r+(1-p2)(r+xd)>r+(1-p1)•r. Without the doctrine, he can get the benefit of the investment and
is less likely to be overthrown. The public’s relative utility, on the other hand, is
ambiguous. With the doctrine, the public earns p1•u(r), whereas without, it earns
u(y)+p2•u(r+x-d). While the probability of having a representative government
in t=4 is higher (p1>p2), the public does not receive the benefit of the quasipublic investment undertaken by the dictator (u(r+x-d)>u(r)). Particularly if
u(y)>0, the public is more likely to be worse off with the doctrine than without.
However, since the dictator realizes a higher utility with no odious debt
doctrine, the dictator is more likely to stage a coup at t=1.
These examples lead to a few generalizations: First, the dictator will always
prefer the regime with no odious debt doctrine because it allows him to stay in
power longer and gives him a higher expected utility from being in power,
either through additional consumption that imposes a negative externality onto
the public or through quasi-public investment. Thus, the odious debt doctrine
makes the coup at t=1 less likely.
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Second, on average, the odious debt doctrine makes it more difficult for the
dictator to implement the quasi-public project. The dictator prefers to borrow
for personal consumption instead. When the doctrine is in place, the dictator
implements the project only in the second case.
Third, it is unclear whether the doctrine benefits the public. Conditional on
the investment’s being made or not, the doctrine increases the public’s utility by
(1) decreasing the probability that the dictator will stay in power, (2) decreasing
the probability that a would-be dictator will come to power, and (3) either
eliminating the negative externality imposed by the dictator’s consumption or
allowing the public to better enjoy the positive externality from the dictator’s
quasi-public investment. However, because the dictator is less likely to make
the quasi-public investment under the doctrine, the public is less likely to be
able to enjoy the fruits of such investment. Especially when u(y) is large, the
loss of (potential) benefit to the public will outweigh the gains.
B. Empirical Premises
In principle, the odious debt doctrine could be selectively applied to avoid
harming the public. Consider case 3. With the doctrine, the dictator does not
make the quasi-public investment. If the public’s benefit from the investment is
large, the doctrine should not be imposed, whereas, if small, it should. The
determination should be based primarily on two factors: the size of the benefit,
both tangible and intangible, to the public (u(y) and u(x-d)) and the differential
probability of overthrowing the dictatorial regime (p1 versus p2). If
p1•u(r)>u(y)+p2•u(r+x-d), the doctrine should be imposed; otherwise, the
doctrine should not be imposed. It is doubtful that decisionmakers can reliably
perform these calculations on a case-by-case basis and possible that, in an
aggregate sense, the inequality does not hold.
1. The Doctrine Will Deter Borrowing for Personal Consumption Without
Interfering Excessively with Borrowing for Quasi-Public Investment that
Benefits the Public.
Consider the empirical premises of this inequality. First, the variable y—the
benefit the public receives from projects. Some of the literature implies that
dictators frequently borrow money for the express purpose of building
themselves unnecessary palaces. However, dictators generally become wealthy
by taking kickbacks on public contracts and through similar forms of
corruption. They build roads, airports, power plants, dams, and ports, and,
although they skim off profits, the resulting infrastructure benefits the public, at
least a little.12 For example, a government might use a loan to build a bridge or
some other public project but would demand kickbacks from the contractor. If a
$10 million loan is used to build a $9 million bridge, with government ministers
skimming of the extra $1 million, is this an odious debt? If so, the doctrine

12. See ADAMS, supra note 5, passim; MARTIN MEREDITH, THE FATE OF AFRICA passim (2006).
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discourages an investment that could benefit the public; if not, the doctrine will
have little effect on actual behavior. No doubt the dictators prefer this form of
corruption because it gives them some political cover, but, by the same token,
this form of corruption is not as bad as borrowing for personal consumption
alone. Although there are well-known cases of prestige projects that yielded no
gain to the public,13 most serious defenders of the odious debt doctrine do not
argue that dictatorial governments should be deprived of credit for legitimate
projects, even if they turn out to be failures.
During the past half century, numerous dictatorial regimes borrowed money
from foreign creditors and made investments in infrastructure and industry,
investments that have paid off for future generations. Chile under Augusto
Pinochet, South Korea under Park Chung Hee, and Singapore under Lee Kwan
Yew are classic development success stories. China’s authoritarian regime has
borrowed tremendous sums, and currently China is enjoying rapid economic
growth. Even the authoritarian regimes that have been less successful in
promoting economic growth cannot, in most cases, be accused of using foreign
debt for personal consumption. The Latin American dictatorships, for example,
did not squander their loans on consumption; they invested poorly. And even
the worst kleptocratic dictators in Africa did not consume all of their loans.
They used them mainly to pay off political supporters and to finance the army.14
All regimes must, to some extent, make transfer payments to keep domestic
peace and to finance the army to protect the country from domestic unrest and
foreign invasion; these types of payments are quasi-public investments because
the public benefits from peace and domestic order.
Even more troublesome, straightforward borrowing for personal
consumption is not necessarily harmful to the public. One cannot determine
whether a particular debt is odious in isolation. Governments obtain funds from
tax receipts and loans. There is no sense in which the two sources can be kept
separate from each other. Thus, a dictator can evade the odious debt doctrine
by arbitrarily designating bank loans as the source for public projects and tax
revenue as the source for the dictator’s consumption. The only way that the
doctrine could limit borrowing would be if the dictator seeks to spend more
money on himself than he could obtain from tax revenues alone. However, in
nearly all realistic cases, extremely greedy dictators can satisfy themselves from
tax revenues. By contrast, the original example of odious debt was a rare
instance in which borrowed funds went directly into the pocket of the dictator.15
The main effect of the odious debt doctrine is to encourage dictators to be
short-sighted. Because they are less likely to collect the return on investment,

13. See, e.g., ADAMS supra note 5, at 110–18 (describing projects that yielded little or no gain or
turned out to be unneeded).
14. See ADAMS, supra note 5, at 110–31 (describing projects).
15. As Buchheit et al., supra note 4, at 22, observe, the modern defenders of the odious debt
doctrine appear to defend a broader version of the rule, one that applies to any debt incurred by a
dictator. A clear example is ADAMS, supra note 5 (discussing Tinoco).
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they are less likely to invest. If the odious debt doctrine increases the
probability of being overthrown by a great enough amount, the dictator will
borrow in order to consume rather than borrow in order to invest. In the
limiting case, he will not invest at all. Although the public does not have to
repay the debt for his consumption, it will also suffer from lower economic
growth because he did not invest.
2. The Doctrine Will Substantially Increase the Probability that the Public
Will Overthrow a Dictator and Replace Him with a Representative
Government.
One might think that an argument in favor of the odious debt doctrine is
that it increases the probability that the public will overthrow the dictator by
offering the public debt relief if the attempt to overthrow succeeds. However,
this argument ignores the way that the prospect of being overthrown affects the
incentives of the dictator and hence public welfare.16 If the odious debt doctrine
increases the risk of being overthrown, the dictator has less incentive to make
quasi-public investments.
Ironically, the case for the odious debt doctrine is strongest if the doctrine
has no effect on the probability that the dictator will be overthrown. If it has no
effect, then the dictator’s choice between investing and consuming will not be
affected by whether the doctrine is in place. Thus, the only effect of the doctrine
would be to release the public from debt if the overthrow occurs—a
straightforward utility gain.
One might argue that this is in fact the case. Overthrowing a dictator is
dangerous and risky, and the public is subject to a collective-action problem. In
practice, the question for members of the public is whether to throw their
support behind opponents of the dictator. The public can do so by engaging in
strikes, protesting in the streets, and so forth. But these are highly costly
actions—dictators typically react to them by torturing and murdering
opponents—and so the incentive to free-ride will be high. And the public might
expect that the opponents, when in power, will be no better than the dictator.
However, it is doubtful that the odious debt doctrine would have no effect
on the probability of the dictator being overthrown. It is true that overthrowing
a dictator is risky, but this is true whether or not the doctrine is in place. Given
the background risks, debt release increases the reward. The doctrine ensures
that the public has much to gain from the overthrow—debt relief—and the
worse the dictator, the greater the benefit of overthrowing him. And typically
revolutions against dictators are led by political entrepreneurs who will
internalize some of the gains.

16. See supra text at Part III.A.
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3. The Doctrine Will Substantially Reduce the Probability that Would-Be
Dictators Will Seek Power.
Although this premise might be correct, it does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that the odious debt doctrine will unambiguously benefit the public.
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that having a representative government is
always better than having a dictatorial regime, regardless of the dictator’s
choice between investment and consumption: u(r)+u(r) is larger than both
p1•u(r) and u(y)+p2•u(r+x-d). One might think that if would-be dictators are less
likely to seek power because of the doctrine, the public will also be more likely
to overthrow an authoritarian government with the doctrine than without.
If the odious debt doctrine makes the dictator more short-sighted and less
likely to make quasi-public investment, even though the probability that a
dictator might come into power is lower, the public is worse off if one does. The
net welfare effect of the doctrine, therefore, will depend on how much worse off
the public would be under a dictatorial regime and how much less likely
aspiring dictators would be to seek power because of the doctrine.
4. If Applied Correctly, The Doctrine Will Reduce the Debt Burdens of
Representative Governments.
It is not clear representative governments can afford to repudiate even
odious debts. A government that repudiates debts, even with legal sanction,
may be adjudged a high credit risk and refused further loans, or only given
further loans at a high rate of interest. Thus, it is quite possible that the odious
debt doctrine would have no effect on the debt burden of a post-dictatorial
country.
Why might this be the case? Suppose there is some uncertainty about
whether an existing government’s loans will be subsequently treated as odious
debt. Creditors might fear that, although the government is nominally a
representative government, a later decisionmaker will determine that the
representative institutions were not what they seemed and that power was
exercised behind the scenes by a dictator. Suppose further that a future
decisionmaker may be unable to determine whether loan proceeds were used to
pay for a dictator’s consumption or for a public project. Creditors will be
unwilling to lend to this government.
Now, if the government seeks to maintain its creditworthiness, one way it
can do so is by repaying the odious debts of the prior government. This will
signal to creditors that future governments will behave in the same way, and
this will resolve its concerns about lending to it. Another solution is to stipulate
that the odious debt doctrine will apply to loans only after the regime has been
designated odious by an international institution or important nations.17

17. Jayachandran & Kremer, supra note 5, at 90–91.
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However, this requisite would significantly weaken the doctrine since
international agreement on these matters is difficult to achieve.18
C. A Comparison to Jayachandran and Kremer
Jayachandran and Kremer provide a defense of the odious debt doctrine.19
In their model, as in ours, a would-be dictator moves first by seizing power or
not seizing power. Next, the government (dictator or not) allocates resources to
a productive activity (fruit-growing, in their example) or to an activity that
benefits mainly the government (palace-building). The government can also
authorize international trade in fruit, and can buy the inputs (marble) for
palaces from foreign firms. Citizens are paid a wage whether they build palaces
or harvest fruit, but, if resources are devoted to fruit-growing, they also benefit
from the consumption of fruit. Productivity varies across time, and governments
can borrow during productive years so they will have more funds during
unproductive years.
Good governments will borrow in order to smooth citizens’ consumption
across time: that is, they borrow from foreign creditors during the unproductive
year, use the money to buy fruit for citizens, and then pay back the loan during
the productive year, when the excess harvest is sold internationally. Bad
governments will borrow in order to ensure palace production during
unproductive years; they leave office and subsequent populations must repay
the loan.
In the absence of the odious debt doctrine, there is a reputational
equilibrium in which all creditors are repaid, whether or not the debt was
odious, because they have a credible threat to sue a government that defaults. If
a government defaults, creditors bring suit in a country in which the
government has assets. Domestic and international law provides that, indeed,
the assets of the debtor country can be seized by creditors. The odious debt
doctrine provides that the creditors cannot seize the assets of the debtor in the
creditors’ countries if the debtor is a successor government to a dictatorship
that used the borrowed funds to enrich the rulers rather than to benefit the
public.
Under these assumptions, Jayachandran and Kremer show that the odious
debt doctrine improves the welfare of the affected population. Specifically, the
doctrine destroys the reputational equilibrium in which a successor government
voluntarily repays the odious debt incurred by the previous dictatorial regime.
In equilibrium, creditors lend to nonodious governments and refuse to lend to
dictators, and this reduces the incentive of would-be dictators to take power in
the first place. The reduced probability of a dictatorship benefits the public.
And even if dictators come to power, they are prevented from borrowing

18. See infra Part IV.
19. Jayachandran & Kremer, supra note 5.
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money to build palaces and so cannot force a future generation to pay interest
on a loan that does not benefit the public.
Jayachandran and Kremer’s model differs from ours in three main ways.
First, it does not permit the dictator to make a quasi-public investment.
Dictators can only consume, that is, build a palace at the expense of growing
fruit, with the borrowed money. As a result, dictators’ activities are
unambiguously bad. As demonstrated above,20 this assumption is unrealistic.
Dictators build roads to transport troops that the public can use as well.
Dictators build better mechanisms to extract natural resources that benefit later
generations. Dictators fight insurgents who injure civilians as well as threaten
the security of the dictatorship. Thus, Jayachandran and Kremer’s model is
biased in favor of shutting off credit. They acknowledge that the odious debt
doctrine is attractive only if it is “applied against regimes that are borrowing
against the people’s interests,”21 but they fail to acknowledge that the
assumption about the absence of quasi-public investments is unrealistic.
Second, Jayachandran and Kremer assume that the dictator is always
overthrown after one period: the probability of being overthrown is one. This
assumption also biases the dictator’s incentives in favor of short-term
consumption rather than long-term investment because the dictator cannot
enjoy any of the returns from the investment. In our model, the dictator has
only a risk of being overthrown. If he invests, he has a chance of obtaining a
return, and that return motivates the dictator’s investment. In our model, the
sole reason the dictator would want to invest in a project is to be able to build
an even bigger palace tomorrow. But, if the dictator is thrown out before the
palace is built, the public may be able to enjoy the returns on that investment.
Furthermore, if the investment itself has some benefit to the public that the
dictator cannot capture, u(y)>0, trying to provide incentives to the dictator to
favor that quasi-public investment may be beneficial to the public.
Third, Jayachandran and Kremer focus on comparing loan and trade
sanctions, which our model does not explicitly analyze. Jayachandran and
Kremer argue that the historic weakness of trade sanctions should not
discourage the adoption of a system of loan sanctions because their model
shows that loan sanctions are more likely to work and have better welfare
properties than trade sanctions do. However, this argument is problematic.
Jayachandran and Kremer assume that loan sanctions are enforceable
because creditors can collect in only one or a limited number of countries,
whereas odious governments can trade with people in any state.22 Thus, the
collective action problem in enforcing trade sanctions is greater than the
collective-action problem in enforcing loan sanctions. This claim is important
for Jayachandran and Kremer because they acknowledge that trade sanctions
20. See generally supra Part III.A.3.
21. Jayachandran & Kremer, supra note 5, at 89.
22. Note that on the assumption that mere reputation is not sufficient to support sovereign
borrowing, there must be an additional sanction, such as loss of assets.
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have been unsatisfactory.23 The problem with this argument is that governments
can choose not to place assets in, or can choose to withdraw assets from,
countries that will not make them available to creditors if the governments
default. Thus, if the United States and the European Union adopted the odious
debt doctrine, then new dictatorships would remove their assets from these
countries and place them in other countries, which would be happy to take
them in return for a fee or other diplomatic benefits. Western investors could
easily invest in firms operating in those countries, which in turn would lend to
the odious dictators. The collective action problem is identical to that in the
trade area, unless only a small number of countries can be trusted to hold assets
and dispose of them properly. This is unlikely, and in any event similar
limitations apply to trade—for example, only certain countries are reliable
suppliers of marble, et cetera.
In addition, the superior welfare benefits of loan sanctions are also driven
by an assumption that a dictator will not respond to loan sanctions by selling
more nonrenewable resources to the international market. Jayachandran and
Kremer admit as much in a footnote,24 but do not acknowledge the importance
of this fact. History shows that odious regimes typically sell nonrenewable
resources such as oil (Nigeria) and diamonds (Sierra Leone). If a dictatorial
regime cannot borrow because of the odious debt doctrine, the regime might
attempt to extract and sell inefficiently large quantities of nonrenewable natural
resources to build a palace, whereas, with a trade sanction but no loan sanction,
there may be less depletion, benefiting the future population.
There is no reason to think loan sanctions are superior to trade sanctions. If
loan sanctions are applied routinely, then states will withdraw assets from the
states in which they would otherwise store the assets. There may be limits on
the extent to which states can do this, but there is also no reason to think that
depriving dictatorships of places to store assets is any more or less effective a
type of sanction than other forms of diplomatic pressure or use of resources
(such as withdrawal of foreign aid).
IV
A NOTE ON EXTERNAL BENEFITS FROM COOPERATING WITH DICTATORS
Foreign powers, including western powers, have frequently cooperated with
dictators rather than isolate them. Cooperation has had many motivations.
First, many dictators preside over long-suffering populations. In many
instances, a dictator is the cause of the population’s suffering, but in many other
cases he is not. A western government that seeks to aid a population wracked
by famine, drought, disease, economic distress, ethnic conflict, and so forth

23. The literature on trade sanctions is substantial, and the evidence of their effectiveness is mixed
and hard to summarize. The classic monograph on the topic is HUFBAUER, supra note 3, at 92–93
(finding thirty-four-percent success rate in 116 postwar cases).
24. Jayachandran & Kremer, supra note 5, at 88 n.7.

03__CHOI_POSNER.DOC

50

12/6/2007 8:58:40 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 70:33

almost always must work through the government, even if it is a dictatorship.
Dictatorial governments frequently condition access to the populations on
payments to the government itself—or simply structure or control the aid
distribution in a way to ensure that it receives a portion. Donors face a difficult
choice, and many rationally bribe the dictator, or tolerate kickbacks and other
forms of corruption that benefit the dictator, so he will allow them to help his
population.25
Second, many dictators control states that have strategic value or that are
simply too important to ignore. During the Cold War, the United States and
other western powers frequently felt they had to support dictators in order to
limit the spread of Soviet influence.26 Today, the United States makes use of
dictators to help track down terrorists, control drug smugglers, resolve conflicts,
and provide military bases. Dictators must always be bribed, in cash or in kind,
for their support.
A western government can bribe dictators in many ways. It can give them
cash payments, and this is done frequently. It can give them technical assistance
or military support. It can offer favorable terms of trade. And it can offer credit
or access to credit. Obviously, offering credit is inconsistent with the odious
debt rule. But it would be odd to deny credit under the odious debt rule while
engaging in other types of transfers. Isolating dictators is frequently not a viable
strategy—because it just leads to greater suffering for the population or
interferes with other important strategic interests. As long as this is the case,
there is no reason to single out credit for restriction.
The larger point is that international relations are fluid; governments need
flexibility to deal with dictators. One could at least imagine a legal regime that
required isolation of dictators; if states stuck by it, at least it would have a
meaningful effect. Or one could continue with the current regime, under which
pressure is exerted in an episodic fashion and mainly against states that are not
of strategic value to western powers. But a regime that singles out credit while
preserving all other forms of cooperation, including aid, makes no sense at all.
The need for flexibility in regulating access to credit can be seen by
comparing loan sanctions with trade sanctions. Hufbauer and his coauthors’
empirical survey suggested that trade sanctions tend to work only when certain
conditions are satisfied: (1) the target must be relatively weak, and the goals
must be relatively limited; (2) many states participate; (3) the target must be an
ally or have some friendly relationship with the state that imposes the sanctions;
(4) the sanctions must be applied quickly rather than incrementally; and (5) the
sanctions cannot be too costly for the sanctioning country.27 If this is true for
trade, it is surely true for loan sanctions. But because the odious debt doctrine

25. For numerous examples, see ADAMS, supra note 5.
26. See ODD ARNE WESTAD, THE GLOBAL COLD WAR: THIRD WORLD INTERVENTIONS AND
THE MAKING OF OUR TIMES (2005).
27. HUFBAUER, supra note 3, at 94–105.
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does not incorporate these factors—and how could one have a legal rule that is
applied only against the weak?—it is not likely to work as intended.
A final problem is that efforts to pressure dictators can be undermined by
geopolitical rivalries. For example, current western efforts to pressure Sudan to
halt the genocide in Darfur are being undermined by China, which purchases
Sudanese oil and seeks to enhance its influence in Africa.28 Rivalries of this kind
have been a common problem for trade sanctions and are likely to be a problem
for loan sanctions as well. The frequent lack of international agreement about
whether a dictator should be pressured provides grounds for skepticism about
Jayachandran and Kremer’s proposal that an international organization have
the authority to declare when a regime is officially odious.29
V
CONCLUSION
Loan sanctions pressure dictators to give up power and may deter would-be
dictators from taking power in the first place, but they also harm the
dictatorship’s public when dictators are not deterred, and they interfere with
diplomatic efforts to obtain cooperation from dictators in matters of general
interest. The odious debt doctrine as currently formulated and defended does
not take account of all morally relevant factors.
The traditional backward-looking defense of the odious debt doctrine,
which suggests that the doctrine is costless because it releases a suffering
population from an unjust debt, is seriously incomplete. Our model makes clear
that because the dictator controls the government, the doctrine necessarily
harms the public if it is to affect the incentives of the dictator. Although in
specific cases the benefits of loan sanctions may exceed the costs, the defenders
of the doctrine have not made the empirical case that the net benefits are
sufficiently high in the aggregate as to warrant routine application of loan
sanctions to odious dictators. In the absence of such a showing, there is no
reason to think that the odious debt doctrine would be a desirable rule of
international law.

28. See, e.g., BBC News, Chinese Leader Boosts Sudan Ties, Feb. 2, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/africa/6323017.stm (last visited Oct. 2, 2007).
29. They propose this institution in order to reduce uncertainty, so creditors will not refrain from
lending to a deserving nation for fear that it will subsequently be declared odious. See also Seema
Jayachandran, Michael Kremer & Jonathan Shafter, Applying the Odious Debts Doctrine While
Preserving Legitimate Lending, ETHICS & INT’L AFF. (2006). For reasons given in the text, we are
skeptical about the viability of such an institution. On this problem, see Paul B. Stephan, The
Institutionalist Implications of an Odious Debt Doctrine, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 213 (Summer
2007).

